Equivocations for the simple substitution cipher with erasure-prone ciphertext

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze an attack scenario for the simple substitution cipher using the wiretap channel model, where the attacker only has access to error-prone ciphertext at the output of a packet erasure channel (PEC). Each packet is comprised of exactly one symbol of ciphertext, and hence, the attacker's channel could be viewed as a symbol erasure… (More)
DOI: 10.1109/ITW.2012.6404752

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Cite this paper

@article{Harrison2012EquivocationsFT, title={Equivocations for the simple substitution cipher with erasure-prone ciphertext}, author={Willie K. Harrison and Steven W. McLaughlin}, journal={2012 IEEE Information Theory Workshop}, year={2012}, pages={622-626} }