Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice

  title={Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice},
  author={Claude d'Aspremont and Louis Gevers},
  journal={The Review of Economic Studies},
We consider the problem of a planner or ethical observer who wants to derive a collective preference ordering over a set of feasible alternatives from the knowledge of individual utility functions. By assumption, he is concerned with social welfare judgements, not with committee decisions. As a tool of analysis, we use the concept of social welfare functional (SWFL), which was developed by Sen [9] on foundations originally laid down by Arrow [1]. Rather than to compare SWFL’s directly, we treat… 

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