• Corpus ID: 231698761

Equitable Division of a Path

@article{Misra2021EquitableDO,
  title={Equitable Division of a Path},
  author={Neeldhara Misra and Chinmay Sonar and P. R. Vaidyanathan and Rohit Vaish},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2021},
  volume={abs/2101.09794}
}
We study fair resource allocation under a connectedness constraint wherein a set of indivisible items are arranged on a path and only connected subsets of items may be allocated to the agents. An allocation is deemed fair if it satisfies equitability up to one good (EQ1), which requires that agents’ utilities are approximately equal. We show that achieving EQ1 in conjunction with well-studied measures of economic efficiency (such as Pareto optimality, non-wastefulness, maximum egalitarian or… 

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