Equilibrium selection by co-evolution for bargaining problems under incomplete information about time preferences

@article{Jin2005EquilibriumSB,
  title={Equilibrium selection by co-evolution for bargaining problems under incomplete information about time preferences},
  author={Nanlin Jin},
  journal={2005 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation},
  year={2005},
  volume={3},
  pages={2661-2668 Vol. 3}
}
The main purpose of this work is to measure the impact of players' information completeness on the outcomes in dynamic strategic games. We apply co-evolutionary algorithms to solve four incomplete information bargaining problems and investigate the experimental outcomes on players' shares from agreements, the efficiency of agreements and the evolutionary time for convergence. Empirical analyses indicate that in the absence of complete information on the counterpart(s)' preferences, co-evolving… CONTINUE READING

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