Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion*

  title={Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion*},
  • Published 2003
There are significant differences between the situation of players undertaking to play a single game, and players who know that they will play the same game repeatedly in the future. Strategy in the first case is a single play; in the second, it is a sequence of rules, each one of which designates the play at the corresponding game and may pertain to the outcomes preceding. The preferences of the participants are determined partly by temporal considerations, and the participants may adopt… CONTINUE READING

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