Corpus ID: 49346873

Equilibrium and Learning in Queues with Advance Reservations

  title={Equilibrium and Learning in Queues with Advance Reservations},
  author={E. Simhon and D. Starobinski},
  • E. Simhon, D. Starobinski
  • Published 2018
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • ArXiv
  • Consider a multi-class preemptive-resume $M/D/1$ queueing system that supports advance reservations (AR). In this system, strategic customers must decide whether to reserve a server in advance (thereby gaining higher priority) or avoid AR. Reserving a server in advance bears a cost. In this paper, we conduct a game-theoretic analysis of this system, characterizing the equilibrium strategies. Specifically, we show that the game has two types of equilibria. In one type, none of the customers… CONTINUE READING

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