• DOI:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2018.13
Corpus ID: 4695878

Equilibrium Selection in Information Elicitation without Verification via Information Monotonicity

@inproceedings{Kong2018EquilibriumSI,
  title={Equilibrium Selection in Information Elicitation without Verification via Information Monotonicity},
  author={Yuqing Kong and Grant Schoenebeck},
  booktitle={ITCS},
  year={2018}
}

Yuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck

Published in ITCS 2018

Mathematics, Computer Science

Peer-prediction is a mechanism which elicits privately-held, non-variable information from self-interested agents---formally, truth-telling is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. The original Peer-prediction mechanism suffers from two main limitations: (1) the mechanism must know the "common prior" of agents' signals; (2) additional undesirable and non-truthful equilibria exist which often have a greater expected payoff than the truth-telling equilibrium. A series of results has… CONTINUE READING

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