Equilibrium Selection in Information Elicitation without Verification via Information Monotonicity

@inproceedings{Kong2018EquilibriumSI,
  title={Equilibrium Selection in Information Elicitation without Verification via Information Monotonicity},
  author={Yuqing Kong and Grant Schoenebeck},
  booktitle={ITCS},
  year={2018}
}
  • Yuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck
  • Published in ITCS 2018
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Peer-prediction is a mechanism which elicits privately-held, non-variable information from self-interested agents---formally, truth-telling is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. The original Peer-prediction mechanism suffers from two main limitations: (1) the mechanism must know the "common prior" of agents' signals; (2) additional undesirable and non-truthful equilibria exist which often have a greater expected payoff than the truth-telling equilibrium. A series of results has… CONTINUE READING
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