• Corpus ID: 246035481

Equilibria of Time-inconsistent Stopping for One-dimensional Diffusion Processes

@inproceedings{Bayraktar2022EquilibriaOT,
  title={Equilibria of Time-inconsistent Stopping for One-dimensional Diffusion Processes},
  author={Erhan Bayraktar and Zhenhua Wang and Zhou Zhou},
  year={2022}
}
We consider three equilibrium concepts proposed in the literature for time-inconsistent stopping problems, including mild equilibria (introduced in [7]), weak equilibria (introduced in [4]) and strong equilibria (introduced in [1]). The discount function is assumed to be log sub-additive and the underlying process is one-dimensional diffusion. We first provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the characterization of weak equilibria. The smooth-fit condition is obtained as a by-product… 

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