Corpus ID: 232170263

Equilibria in Auctions With Ad Types

  title={Equilibria in Auctions With Ad Types},
  author={Hadi Elzayn and Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi and Brian Lan and Okke Schrijvers},
This paper studies equilibrium quality of semi-separable position auctions (known as the Ad Types setting [10]) with greedy or optimal allocation combined with generalized second-price (GSP) or VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) pricing. We make three contributions: first, we give upper and lower bounds on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) for auctions which use greedy allocation with GSP pricing, greedy allocations with VCG pricing, and optimal allocation with GSP pricing. Second, we give Bayes-Nash… Expand
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