Equilibria Under the Probabilistic Serial Rule

  title={Equilibria Under the Probabilistic Serial Rule},
  author={Haris Aziz and Serge Gaspers and Simon Mackenzie and Nicholas Mattei and Nina Narodytska and Toby Walsh},
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof. In view of this, we address several fundamental questions regarding equilibria under PS. Firstly, we show that Nash deviations under the PS rule can cycle. Despite the possibilities of cycles, we prove that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule. We then show that… CONTINUE READING


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