Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism

  title={Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism},
  author={Grace Helton},
  journal={Philosophical Perspectives},
  • Grace Helton
  • Published 23 October 2021
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Perspectives
There are almost 8 billion human beings on the planet. Some of these I know personally. They are my colleagues, neighbors, friends, and family members. Others are distant strangers, most of whom I will never meet. I take it for granted that all of these beings are, like myself, sentient. I presume that they have opinions and aspirations, hopes and dreads; that they experience intense pleasures and sharp pains, along with dull aches, surprise, simple satisfaction, ennui, and deep longing; that… 


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