Epistemic freedom revisited

@article{Antill2018EpistemicFR,
  title={Epistemic freedom revisited},
  author={G. Antill},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2018},
  volume={197},
  pages={793-815}
}
  • G. Antill
  • Published 2018
  • Psychology, Computer Science
  • Synthese
Philosophers have recently argued that self-fulfilling beliefs constitute an important counter-example to the widely accepted theses that we ought not and cannot believe at will. Cases of self-fulfilling belief are thought to constitute a special class where we enjoy the epistemic freedom to permissibly believe for pragmatic reasons, because whatever we choose to believe will end up true. In this paper, I argue that this view fails to distinguish between the aim of acquiring a true belief and… Expand
3 Citations
Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact
Agency, Akrasia, and the Normative Environment
  • G. Antill
  • Philosophy
  • Journal of the American Philosophical Association
  • 2019
  • 1

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 63 REFERENCES
Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth
  • J. Drake
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Synthese
  • 2016
  • 8
In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief
  • 24
  • PDF
Ethics of Belief
  • 104
Believing at Will is Possible
  • 21
Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity
  • 112
The Right Thing to Believe
  • 22
  • PDF
Problems of the Self: Deciding to believe
  • 326
The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem
  • 67
The Illusion of Exclusivity
  • 26
  • PDF
No Exception for Belief
  • 51
  • PDF
...
1
2
3
4
5
...