Epistemic considerations of decision making in games

@article{Kaneko1999EpistemicCO,
  title={Epistemic considerations of decision making in games},
  author={Mamoru Kaneko},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
  year={1999},
  volume={38},
  pages={105-137}
}
  • M. Kaneko
  • Published 1 September 1999
  • Economics
  • Mathematical Social Sciences

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Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an 'n'-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe - about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and
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We show the faithful embedding of common knowledge logic CKL into game logic GL, that is, CKL is embedded into GL and GL is a conservative extension of the fragment obtained by this embedding. Then
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