Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility

@article{Almeida2011EpistemicCS,
  title={Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility},
  author={C. D. Almeida},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2011},
  volume={188},
  pages={197-215}
}
Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske’s lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure… Expand

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