• DOI:10.1215/00318108-2087645
Corpus ID: 3947127

Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions

@article{Berker2013EpistemicTA,
  title={Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions},
  author={S. Berker},
  journal={The Philosophical Review},
  year={2013},
  volume={122},
  pages={337-393}
}

S. Berker

Published 2013

Philosophy

The Philosophical Review

When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is: “Yes, we should.” In this essay I argue to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to the right in ethics often leads one… CONTINUE READING

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