Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity

@article{Lee2014EpistemicPA,
  title={Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity},
  author={B. D. Lee},
  journal={Philosophia},
  year={2014},
  volume={42},
  pages={413-432}
}
Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I… Expand
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