Epistemic Permissiveness

@inproceedings{WhiteEpistemicP,
  title={Epistemic Permissiveness},
  author={R. White}
}
A rational person doesn't believe just anything. There are limits on what it is rational to believe. How wide are these limits? That's the main question that interests me here. But a secondary question immediately arises: What factors impose these limits? A first stab is to say that one's evidence determines what it is epistemically permissible for one to believe. Many will claim that there are further, non-evidentiary factors relevant to the epistemic rationality of belief. I will be ignoring… Expand
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