Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions

@article{Anderson2012EpistemicJA,
  title={Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions},
  author={Elizabeth S. Anderson},
  journal={Social Epistemology},
  year={2012},
  volume={26},
  pages={163 - 173}
}
  • E. Anderson
  • Published 1 April 2012
  • Philosophy
  • Social Epistemology
In Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker makes a tremendous contribution to theorizing the intersection of social epistemology with theories of justice. Theories of justice often take as their object of assessment either interpersonal transactions (specific exchanges between persons) or particular institutions. They may also take a more comprehensive perspective in assessing systems of institutions. This systemic perspective may enable control of the cumulative effects of millions of individual… 

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