Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments

@inproceedings{Colao2014EpistemicII,
  title={Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments},
  author={David Colaço and Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich and Edouard Machery},
  year={2014}
}
In epistemology, fake-barn thought experiments are often taken to be intuitively clear cases in which a justified true belief does not qualify as knowledge. We report a study designed to determine whether non-philosophers share this intuition. The data suggest that while participants are less inclined to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases than in unproblematic cases of knowledge, they nonetheless do attribute knowledge to protagonists in fake-barn cases. Moreover, the intuition that fake… CONTINUE READING

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