Epistemic Internalism, Philosophical Assurance and the Skeptical Predicament

  title={Epistemic Internalism, Philosophical Assurance and the Skeptical Predicament},
  author={Richard Fumerton},
It is a particular pleasure to contribute this paper to a volume honoring Al Plantinga. I have always viewed his work as a model of how to do philosophy and I have learned a great deal from him over the years. It is as a result of philosophical conversation with both Plantinga and his former student Michael Bergmann that I have come to the (always painful) conclusion that I need to revise some of the things that I have said in print. This paper is an attempt to do just that. In Metaepistemology… 
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