Epistemic Decision Theory

@inproceedings{Greaves2014EpistemicDT,
  title={Epistemic Decision Theory},
  author={Hilary Greaves},
  year={2014}
}
I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads to a proliferation of puzzle cases and theories to deal with them, including epistemic analogues of… CONTINUE READING
Highly Cited
This paper has 19 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.
13 Citations
11 References
Similar Papers

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 11 references

No Regrets, or

  • F. Arntzenius
  • Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory ’. Erkenntnis,
  • 2008
Highly Influential
6 Excerpts

‘ Rational Probabilistic Incoherence ’

  • M. Caie
  • The Philosophical Review
  • 2013

‘ Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory ’

  • A. Egan
  • The Philosophical Review
  • 2007

Epistemic Consequentialism

  • R. Stalnaker
  • Proceedings of the
  • 2002
1 Excerpt

The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory

  • J. Press. Joyce
  • 1999
1 Excerpt

Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value

  • G. Oddie
  • 1997
2 Excerpts

The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation

  • B. Skyrms
  • 1990
1 Excerpt

The Foundations of Statistics, second edition

  • L. J. Savage
  • British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
  • 1972
2 Excerpts

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…