Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism

@article{Holliday2015EpistemicCA,
  title={Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism},
  author={W. Holliday},
  journal={Journal of Philosophical Logic},
  year={2015},
  volume={44},
  pages={1-62}
}
  • W. Holliday
  • Published 2015
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Journal of Philosophical Logic
Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be… Expand
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Roles, Rigidity, and Quantification in Epistemic Logic
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This paper lays out a philosophical approach to epistemic predicate logic implemented formally in Melvin Fitting’s First-Order Intensional Logic, that it is argued solves conceptual problems not faced in the case of alethic modal predicate logic. Expand
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