Envelopes and Geometrical Covers of Side-Payment Games and Their Market Representations

  title={Envelopes and Geometrical Covers of Side-Payment Games and Their Market Representations},
  author={Philippe Artzner and Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-Andr{\'e} G{\'e}rard-Varet},
  journal={Math. Oper. Res.},
This paper deals with issues concerning the core as a solution concept for games in coalitional form as well as the use of these games in representing economies of a certain formal type. Side-payment games are imbedded in the more general class of no-side-payment games. It is shown that to a given side-payment game having an empty core one may associate two different no-side-payment games with the same nonempty core: the “envelope” and the “geometrical cover.” The discrepancy is explained in… 
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