Ensuring Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems

  title={Ensuring Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems},
  author={Paul Griffioen and Bruce H. Krogh and Bruno Sinopoli},
—This article provides a tool for analyzing mechanisms that aim to achieve resilience against stealthy, or undetectable, attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We consider attackers who are able to corrupt all of the inputs and outputs of the system. To counter such attack- ers, a response scheme must be implemented that keeps the attacker from corrupting the inputs and outputs of the system for certain periods of time. To aid in the design of such a response scheme, our tool provides suf… 

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