Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch

@article{LasonenAarnio2020EnkrasiaOE,
  title={Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch},
  author={Maria Lasonen-Aarnio},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={2020},
  volume={177},
  pages={597-632}
}
I formulate a resilient paradox about epistemic rationality, discuss and reject various solutions, and sketch a way out. The paradox exemplifies a tension between a wide range of views of epistemic justification, on the one hand, and enkratic requirements on rationality, on the other. According to the enkratic requirements, certain mismatched doxastic states are irrational, such as believing p , while believing that it is irrational for one to believe p. I focus on an evidentialist view of… Expand
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