Engineering altruism: a theoretical and experimental investigation of anonymity and gift giving

@article{Burnham2003EngineeringAA,
  title={Engineering altruism: a theoretical and experimental investigation of anonymity and gift giving},
  author={Terence C. Burnham},
  journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  year={2003},
  volume={50},
  pages={133-144}
}
  • T. Burnham
  • Published 2003
  • Art
  • Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

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