Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities

@article{Amir2016EndogenousIA,
  title={Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities},
  author={Rabah Amir and Natalia Lazzati},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
  year={2016},
  volume={163},
  pages={684-698}
}
This paper studies covert (or hidden) information acquisition in common value Bayesian games of strategic complementarities. Using the supermodular stochastic order to arrange the structures of information increasingly in terms of preferences, we provide novel, easily interpretable conditions under which the value of information is globally convex, and study the implications in terms of the equilibrium con…guration. Increasing marginal returns to information lead to extreme behavior in that… CONTINUE READING