Endogenous choice of strategic incentives in a mixed duopoly with a new managerial delegation contract for the public firm ¬リニ

Abstract

Article history: Received 26 March 2014 Received in revised form 11 October 2014 Accepted 14 October 2014 Available online 24 October 2014 This paper revisits the endogenous choice problemof the strategic contracts in amixed duopoly of one public firm and one managerial private firm, with differentiated goods. This paper considers the situation wherein the… (More)

Topics

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Nakamura2016EndogenousCO, title={Endogenous choice of strategic incentives in a mixed duopoly with a new managerial delegation contract for the public firm ¬リニ}, author={Yasuhiko Nakamura}, year={2016} }