Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly : Price Competition with Managerial Delegation ∗

  title={Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly : Price Competition with Managerial Delegation ∗},
  author={Yasuhiko Nakamura and Tomohiro Inoue},
We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the model of Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) and examine its influence on a price-setting mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous timing problem. We obtain the result that the owners of both firms prefer to set their own prices as late as possible, and thus in equilibrium, the firms choose their prices simultaneously in the latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the findings of Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) that firms choose prices simultaneously in… CONTINUE READING
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