Endogenous Preferences in Games with Type Indeterminate Players

Abstract

The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making and show that TI-games open a new field of strategic interaction. We first establish an equivalence result between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We next develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. The updating rule captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting information and payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types. We provide an example showing that TI-game predictions cannot be obtained as Bayes Nash equilibrium of the corresponding

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Cite this paper

@inproceedings{LambertMogiliansky2010EndogenousPI, title={Endogenous Preferences in Games with Type Indeterminate Players}, author={Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky}, booktitle={AAAI Fall Symposium: Quantum Informatics for Cognitive, Social, and Semantic Processes}, year={2010} }