Endogenous Political Institutions

@inproceedings{Aghion2002EndogenousPI,
  title={Endogenous Political Institutions},
  author={Philippe Aghion and Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi},
  year={2002}
}
Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As… CONTINUE READING
Highly Influential
This paper has highly influenced 23 other papers. REVIEW HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL CITATIONS
Highly Cited
This paper has 152 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

From This Paper

Figures and tables from this paper.

Citations

Publications citing this paper.

152 Citations

051015'00'03'07'11'15
Citations per Year
Semantic Scholar estimates that this publication has 152 citations based on the available data.

See our FAQ for additional information.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 33 references

Racial Fragmentation: New Measures and New Results

  • A Alesina, A. Devleeschauer, R. W. Easterly
  • Wacziarg
  • 2002
Highly Influential
7 Excerpts

The Constitution of Liberty

  • F. Hayek
  • 1960
Highly Influential
4 Excerpts

The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment”, Industrial and Corporate Change:Forthcoming

  • W. J. Henisz
  • 2002
Highly Influential
1 Excerpt

Economic Policy in Representative Democracies

  • T. Persson, G. Tabellini
  • 2002
2 Excerpts

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…