Endogenous Corruption in Economic Development ∗

@inproceedings{Blackburn2002EndogenousCI,
  title={Endogenous Corruption in Economic Development ∗},
  author={Keith Blackburn and Niloy Bose and M. Emranul Haque},
  year={2002}
}
This paper presents an analysis of the joint determination of bureaucratic corruption and economic development. The analysis is based on a simple neo-classical growth model in which bureaucrats are employed as agents of the government to collect taxes from households. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with households in providing false information to the government. Costly concealment of this activity leads to a loss of resources available for productive… CONTINUE READING

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