• Corpus ID: 14314175

End-to-end verifiability

  title={End-to-end verifiability},
  author={Josh Benaloh and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan and Philip B. Stark and Vanessa Teague and Poorvi L. Vora},
Author(s): Benaloh, Josh; Rivest, Ronald; Ryan, Peter YA; Stark, Philip; Teague, Vanessa; Vora, Poorvi | Abstract: This pamphlet describes end-to-end election verifiability (E2E-V) for a nontechnical audience: election officials, public policymakers, and anyone else interested in secure, transparent, evidence-based electronic elections. This work is part of the Overseas Vote Foundation's End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting: Specification and Feasibility Assessment Study (E2E VIV Project… 
Public Evidence from Secret Ballots
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A Protocolized, Comparative Study of Helios Voting and Scytl/iVote
The problem is addressed by applying a practical evaluation framework to two of the most relevant e-voting tools: Helios Voting and iVote from Scytl, strongly based on the technical requirements issued by the Council of Europe in 2017.
Proverum: A Hybrid Public Verifiability and Decentralized Identity Management
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Secure and Verifiable Electronic Voting in Practice: the use of vVote in the Victorian State Election
The November 2014 Australian State of Victoria election was the first statutory political election worldwide at State level which deployed an end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system in polling
The Swiss Post/Scytl Transparency Exercise and Its Possible Impact on Internet Voting Regulation
Researchers found critical errors in the source code of both individual and universal verifiability in the Swiss Post/Scytl system, which has fuelled the already heated debate over the future development of internet voting in Switzerland.
How to Assess the Usability Metrics of E-Voting Schemes
An overview of user study design challenges when investigating end-to-end verifiable e-voting schemes is given and guidelines that address these challenges and support researchers in the design of user studies are provided.
RemoteVote and SAFE Vote: Towards Usable End-to-End Verification for Vote-by-Mail
This work presents two approaches, RemoteVote and SAFE Vote, that allow mail-in voters to benefit from E2E-V without changing the voter experience for those who choose not to participate in verification.
Technical and Socio-Technical Attacks on the Danish Party Endorsement System
This paper analyzes the security of the online Danish party endorsement system (DVE) and presents two attacks: one technical, which compromises the integrity of the endorsements stored in the DVE-database and another socio-technical, which allows parties to circumvent mechanisms to protect voters against abuse.
The Effect of Homomorphic Encryption on Voters' Perceptions of Security in Election Systems
This work seeks to determine the degree to which the perception of security affects electoral system use, and would a technical solution, such as homomorphic encryption change the Perception of security in election systems.
TRVote: A New, Trustworthy and Robust Electronic Voting System
TRVote is proposed, a new Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE)-based voting system that is robust and guarantees privacy of voters, and analyzes that it is universally verifiable and secure against coercion.


On the notion of ‘software independence’ in voting systems
  • R. Rivest
  • Computer Science
    Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
  • 2008
This paper defines and explores the notion of ‘software independence’ in voting systems: ‘A voting system is software independent if an (undetected) change or error in its software cannot cause an