Encrypted Receipts for Voter-Verified Elections Using Homomorphic Encryption by Joy

@inproceedings{Forsythe2005EncryptedRF,
  title={Encrypted Receipts for Voter-Verified Elections Using Homomorphic Encryption by Joy},
  author={Marie Forsythe},
  year={2005}
}
  • Marie Forsythe
  • Published 2005
Voters are now demanding the ability to verify that their votes are cast and counted as intended. Most existing cryptographic election protocols do not treat the voter as a computationally-limited entity separate from the voting booth, and therefore do not ensure that the voting booth records the correct vote. David Chaum and Andrew Neff have proposed mixnet schemes that do provide this assurance, but little research has been done that combines voter verification with homomorphic encryption… CONTINUE READING

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