Corpus ID: 148684043

Enactive understanding and motor intentionality

@inproceedings{Sinigaglia2008EnactiveUA,
  title={Enactive understanding and motor intentionality},
  author={C. Sinigaglia},
  year={2008}
}
Most of our social interactions rest upon our ability to understand the behavior of others. But what is really at the basis of this ability? The standard view is that we understand the behavior of others because we are able to read their mind, to represent them as individuals endowed with mental states such as beliefs, desires and intentions. Without this mindreading ability the behavior of others would be meaningless for us. Over the last few years, however, this view has been undermined by… Expand
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