Empirically Investigating the Concept of Lying

  title={Empirically Investigating the Concept of Lying},
  author={Alex Wiegmann and Ronja Rutschmann and Pascale Willemsen},
  journal={Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research},
Lying is an everyday moral phenomenon about which philosophers have written a lot. Not only the moral status of lying has been intensively discussed but also what it means to lie in the first place. Perhaps the most important criterion for an adequate definition of lying is that it fits with people’s understanding and use of this concept. In this light, it comes as a surprise that researchers only recently started to empirically investigate the folk concept of lying. In this paper, we describe… 

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