• Corpus ID: 150374140

Empirical bias and efficiency of alpha-auctions: experimental evidence

@article{Brown2019EmpiricalBA,
  title={Empirical bias and efficiency of alpha-auctions: experimental evidence},
  author={Alexander L. Brown and Rodrigo A. Velez},
  journal={arXiv: General Economics},
  year={2019}
}
We experimentally evaluate the comparative performance of the winner-bid, average-bid, and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. The recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis of Velez and Brown (2019) reveals that as long as behavior satisfies weak payoff monotonicity, winner-bid and loser-bid auctions necessarily exhibit a form of bias when empirical distributions of play approximate best responses. We find support for both weak payoff monotonicity and the form of… 
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