Empirical Physicalism and the Boundaries of Physics

  title={Empirical Physicalism and the Boundaries of Physics},
  author={Michele Paolini Paoletti},
  journal={International Studies in The Philosophy of Science},
I shall argue in this article that there are certain objectual and methodological boundaries imposed by the nature of physics that all formulations of physicalism based on physical theories should respect. Therefore, empirical physicalism—i.e. the sort of physicalism that is eager to accept all the entities included in some future, ideal, and complete physical theory and all entities dependent on them (see Jeffrey Poland and Janice Dowell)—is already committed to the exclusion of certain sorts… 


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