Empirical Evaluation of Voting Rules with Strictly Ordered Preference Data

  title={Empirical Evaluation of Voting Rules with Strictly Ordered Preference Data},
  author={Nicholas Mattei},
  booktitle={Algorithmic Decision Theory},
  • Nicholas Mattei
  • Published in Algorithmic Decision Theory 26 October 2011
  • Economics, Computer Science
The study of voting systems often takes place in the theoretical domain due to a lack of large samples of sincere, strictly ordered voting data.We derive several million elections (more than all the existing studies combined) from a publicly available data, the Netflix Prize dataset. The Netflix data is derived from millions of Netflix users, who have an incentive to report sincere preferences, unlike random survey takers. We evaluate each of these elections under the Plurality, Borda, k… 

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