Corpus ID: 85529105

Empirical Equilibrium

  title={Empirical Equilibrium},
  author={R. Velez and Alexander L. Brown},
  journal={arXiv: Econometrics},
We study the foundations of empirical equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium that is based on a non-parametric characterization of empirical distributions of behavior in games (Velez and Brown,2020b arXiv:1907.12408). The refinement can be alternatively defined as those Nash equilibria that do not refute the regular QRE theory of Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005). By contrast, some empirical equilibria may refute monotone additive randomly disturbed payoff models. As a by product, we show… Expand

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