• Corpus ID: 245986577

Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security

  title={Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security},
  author={Yulin Liu and Yuxuan Lu and Kartik Nayak and Fan Zhang and Luyao Zhang and Yinhong Zhao},
Transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, mempool, and exchanges, we study the effect of EIP-1559, one of the first deployed TFMs that depart from the traditional first-price auction paradigm. We conduct a rigorous and comprehensive empirical study to examine its causal effect on blockchain transaction fee dynamics… 
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