Corpus ID: 237563122

Emergent Collaboration in Social Purpose Games

  title={Emergent Collaboration in Social Purpose Games},
  author={Robert P. Gilles and Lina Mallozzi and Roberta Messalli},
We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games—denoted as social purpose games—in which the payoffs depend separately on a player’s own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players (social benefits) weighted by an individual benefit parameter. ‘is structure allows for an asymmetric assessment of the social benefit across players. We show that these games have a potential and we investigate its properties. We investigate the… Expand


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