Emergence of scale-free characteristics in socio-ecological systems with bounded rationality
@article{Kasthurirathna2015EmergenceOS, title={Emergence of scale-free characteristics in socio-ecological systems with bounded rationality}, author={Dharshana Kasthurirathna and Mahendra Piraveenan}, journal={Scientific Reports}, year={2015}, volume={5} }
Socio–ecological systems are increasingly modelled by games played on complex networks. While the concept of Nash equilibrium assumes perfect rationality, in reality players display heterogeneous bounded rationality. Here we present a topological model of bounded rationality in socio-ecological systems, using the rationality parameter of the Quantal Response Equilibrium. We argue that system rationality could be measured by the average Kullback–-Leibler divergence between Nash and Quantal…
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