Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies

  title={Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies},
  author={Vincenzo Bove and Mauricio Rivera},
  journal={International Interactions},
  pages={453 - 479}
This article provides an explanation for the significant variation in coups in autocracies. The existing theoretical literature focuses on the strategies that leaders use to thwart mass mobilization and survive in power. However, most autocratic leaders lose power through a coup, indicating that the main threats to political survival in autocracies emerge from insiders and not from outside the incumbent coalition. This article focuses on leaders’ strategies to mitigate elite threats and argues… Expand
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