Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes

  title={Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes},
  author={Paul M. Churchland},
  journal={The Journal of Philosophy},
  • P. Churchland
  • Published 1981
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • The Journal of Philosophy
Staying within an objectual interpretation of the quantifiers, perhaps the simplest way to make systematic sense of expressions like ' x believes that P ' and closed sentences formed therefrom is just to construe whatever occurs in :he nested positior. held by 'p', 'g', etc. as there having the function of a singular term. Accordingly, the standard connectives, as they occur between terms in that nested position, must be construed as there functioning as operators that form cornpound singular… Expand
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