Eliciting security requirements by misuse cases

@article{Sindre2000ElicitingSR,
  title={Eliciting security requirements by misuse cases},
  author={Guttorm Sindre and A. Opdahl},
  journal={Proceedings 37th International Conference on Technology of Object-Oriented Languages and Systems. TOOLS-Pacific 2000},
  year={2000},
  pages={120-131}
}
  • G. Sindre, A. Opdahl
  • Published 2000
  • Computer Science
  • Proceedings 37th International Conference on Technology of Object-Oriented Languages and Systems. TOOLS-Pacific 2000
Use case diagrams (L. Jacobson et al., 1992) have proven quite helpful in requirements engineering, both for eliciting requirements and getting a better overview of requirements already stated. However, not all kinds of requirements are equally well supported by use case diagrams. They are good for functional requirements, but poorer at e.g., security requirements, which often concentrate on what should not happen in the system. With the advent of e- and m-commerce applications, security… 

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