Eliciting Coordination with Rebates

  title={Eliciting Coordination with Rebates},
  author={Patrick Maill{\'e} and N. Stier-Moses},
  journal={ERN: Other Game Theory \& Bargaining Theory (Topic)},
This article considers a mechanism based on rebates that aims at reducing congestion in urban networks. The framework helps select rebate levels so that enough commuters switch to modes that are under used. Indeed, getting a relative small number of drivers to switch to public transportation can significantly improve congestion. This mechanism is modeled by a Stackelberg game in which the transportation authority offers rebates, and participants factor them into the costs of each mode. A new… 

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