Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies ∗

@inproceedings{Persson2005ElectoralRA,
  title={Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies ∗},
  author={Torsten Persson and G{\'e}rard Roland and Guido Tabellini},
  year={2005}
}
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy where electoral competition inside coalition governments induces higher spending than under single party governments. Policy preferences of parties are endogenous and derived from opportunistic reelection motives. The electoral rule affects government spending, but only indrectly: proportional elections induce a more fragmented party system and a larger incidence of coalition governments than do majoritarian elections. Empirical… CONTINUE READING
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