Electoral Manipulation via Voter-Friendly Spending : Theory and Evidence

  title={Electoral Manipulation via Voter-Friendly Spending : Theory and Evidence},
  author={Allan Drazen and Marcela Eslava},
We present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to in‡uence voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than overall spending or revenues. Rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation, because it may also re‡ect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor. Classifying expenditures into those which are likely… CONTINUE READING
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