Electoral Contributions and the Cost of Unpopularity

  title={Electoral Contributions and the Cost of Unpopularity},
  author={Thomas Bassetti and Filippo Carlo Pavesi},
  journal={Macroeconomics: Employment},
When considering contributions to electoral campaigns in the U.S., the data reveals that total contributions within industries tend to vary signifcantly over time. To explain this evidence, we present a model in which interest groups finance politicians that require funding for campaign advertising in exchange for policy favors. Our model predicts that interest groups related to industries that experience a rise (decline) in popularity will reduce (increase) the amount of resources devoted to… Expand
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